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Windows Without Curtains:  




ABSTRACT: Focuses on the computer privacy of professors at public universities in the U.S. 
Details of a university police investigation using a professor's computer; Assessment of the 
moral limitation of computer searches on ownership grounds; Application of the Constitution's 




A professor discovers the intricacies of electronic property rights when her computer becomes 
part of a police investigation. What rights do faculty have to work stored on a university's hard 
drive? 
My friend caught her husband cheating. He used a car phone (it was the eighties). She had the 
car phone bill, which listed all the numbers he'd dialed, and one he'd dialed frequently enough to 
arouse her suspicion. So she called her local pizza shop, knowing they kept track of pizza 
deliveries by using the customer's phone number. She simply stated the suspicious phone 
number, in response to which the pizza guy confirmed the name and address--Hillary 
Homebreaker on 123 Deception Drive--where she then drove and made the bust. I celebrated 
the wife's ability to use computerized information systems to her advantage. Of course, the now 
ex-husband undoubtedly regrets the ease with which such information could be obtained. I have 
since learned a little more about life's technological regrets. 
I'd always used information technology to my advantage. I've made a Freedom of Information 
Act request. I've created a Web page so that I could post a piece of criticism that my university's 
newspaper refused to print. I skated on the smooth side of the computer-age-old tension 
between the good and the bad uses of information technology. But when armed police officers 
confiscated and searched the computer from my state university office, without a warrant, I 
began to cross-examine my relationship to computers and investigate professors' computer 
privacy at public universities. 
Space limitations prevent me from providing all the particulars of "Computergate," as the case 
came to be known locally, but here's the upshot: you could find yourself in the same position 
that I did. I had violated no university policy. I simply received an anonymous e-mail (an e-mail 
with a "from" line that read "Anonymous User" and an address of 
<anonymous@remailer.havenco.com>). The e-mail was the "manifesto" of a group claiming 
responsibility for having spray-painted antirape graffiti on the campus the day prior. The brief 
message defended the group's act of property defacement as politically necessary given the 
problem of rape. The manifesto indicated no future action or plans to deface more property or 
hurt people. 
Because I directed the women's studies program, and such current events get discussed in our 
classes, I forwarded the message (with an explanatory preface) to my colleagues on our 
women's studies Listserv. I also forwarded to my colleagues a critique of graffiti as a form of 
activism, written by one of my students. The e-mail manifesto said that I was one of several 
people being sent the manifesto because I was perceived by the senders to be sympathetic to 
their cause. But I neither claimed nor denied any sympathy for their manifesto or form of protest. 
Nevertheless, I became virtual collateral damage. 
In forwarding the e-mail to my colleagues, I attracted the attention of the campus police, who 
wanted the message to trace its origin and catch the senders/vandals. They called to ask me for 
it, and I offered to forward it to them. They explained that a forwarded copy would not be 
traceable to the original sender. I'd only kept a forwarded copy, however (the one I received 
from myself when I sent the message to the Listserv). I didn't know who else had received the e-
mail (I have since learned that at least twenty people on campus received it), but I figured the 
police would check around and get a copy of it from a recipient who hadn't yet deleted it. But 
that isn't what happened. 
Some days later, a campus detective called, asking for my entire computer to perform an e-mail 
recovery operation. I said he did not have my permission to take my entire computer and that I 
was about to leave town to see my father, who'd become critically ill. The day I returned, I found 
two police officers at my campus office to confiscate my computer. The request had become a 
demand. I asked them for a warrant. One officer said that they did not have or need a warrant, 
because the computer was university property. He said I must touch nothing, print out nothing 
(not even the paper I was writing under a publisher's deadline), and shut down the computer. 
My files for which I hold the copyright and in which I have intellectual property fights were not 
"university property," I protested. They conveniently ignored any distinction between the 
machine and the electronic files. 
The university also later ignored that distinction when police and public relations officials told 
inquiring minds that the police had returned the computer a day later. They neglected to 
mention that the police officers had made a copy of the entire contents of the computer's hard 
drive. They copied thirty gigabytes of information for a four-kilobyte e-mail file--over 7.5 million 
times the information they needed. They also neglected to mention that the police made this 
copy after looking through some of my documents. For weeks, people would ask if I got my 
computer back. The answer was yes, but no. 
When I got my copy of the hard drive back (police kept another), I used technology to do my 
own form of surveillance of my hard drive. I found that some of my files had been opened, 
including, for example, those saved as Pervert Evol Narr-Conf Version, WS Pictures, and Sex 
Toy Parties McCaughey. The documents were all part of bona fide research projects, most of 
them published already. The article on women's sex-toy parties was published in the academic 
journal Sexuality and Culture. WS Pictures was a backup file of online images of illustrious 
women--in their clothes. I couldn't help being shocked that my academically legitimate files 
looked like obscenity. After all, it's not as if my computer contained files with titles like 
WSNakedPictures or Pervert under 18. 
Other documents on my computer--and on yours, too, I'm betting--might look suspicious to 
prying eyes. After all, most of us receive spam e-mails of all kinds. Whether it's the penis-
enlargement spam, the Travelocity spam, or the Nigerian-money-scam spam, we are not in 
complete control of what ends up on our computers. I routinely receive sexually explicit jokes 
and political commentaries from friends, colleagues, and creepy fans of my scholarship. I don't 
particularly care for these messages, but unless I find a way to clean such files off my hard 
drive, they're on there. Usually, I'm too busy working as a professor to PC my PC. I don't even 
have time to wash out my coffee cup. 
That the work I do--which I was appointed to do and which I do well and ethically--was suddenly 
the object of police scrutiny left me confused and anxious. For days, I worried about what would 
happen next in this Kafkaesque investigation: Am I going to be fired on specious obscenity 
charges? Was something wrong with having published an article on women's sex-toy parties? 
Am I under investigation for something? Am I being punished for something? What are my 
confiscated files doing out there without me? These questions gnawed at me for the entire 
thirteen months that my files remained with the police. 
I'll leave aside whether or not any evidence gleaned from files obtained this way would have 
stood up in court--although this important question will surely emerge in future cases. As it 
happened, university specialists recovered that deleted e-mail but were unable to trace it to any 
sender's computer, since it was sent from an "anonymizing remailer," which is not traceable. So 
they never had occasion to use any e-mail or other file from the computer formerly known as my 
computer as evidence in any criminal trial. I was never arrested, fired, or reprimanded on 
obscenity or any other charges. 
Yet the confiscation of my computer files not only caused anxieties about the Agents of Oceania 
convicting me of a thought crime. It also felt like a major intrusion, a violation. I'm a writer. I put 
my most cherished thoughts into that computer, articulate my toughest arguments, and 
passionately invest my hopes and ideals. I communicate with and through it. To have it taken 
away from me was like being subjected to some form of sensory deprivation. 
To have it searched left me with a real sense of worry not only about myself but about my 
current and former students. What sort of compromise in confidentiality does this pose to them? 
How are they feeling, and how might this change my relationships with them? Did they really 
believe that the papers they wrote, many of which they turned in by e-mail or through course 
Web sites, belonged to the state? How about the comments with which students entrusted me 
over e-mail--including personal information about being mentally ill, HIV positive, physically 
abused, or addicted to illegal drugs? I imagined my students having technological regrets upon 
hearing about the seizure of my computer and the university's position--stated to the press but 
not in any existing policy--that the university owns not just the computers but also everything on 
them. 
Computergate opens a virtual Pandora's box of questions about our relation ships with, 
ownership of, and access to digital information in our increasingly electronic workplaces. We 
need to engage actively, perhaps even aggressively, the legal and bureaucratic architecture 
surrounding how we interact with computers. Public universities and other state agencies could 
attempt to redefine people's relationships with their computers, construing them as little more 
than surveillance tools or de facto bugs. Those of us who value academic freedom must push 
for open dialogue about what the computer means to us as university workers. We must also 
discuss matters of ownership and access. 
Sometimes ownership matters, and sometimes it doesn't. The reliance on computers at work 
has changed the rules for employees and supervisors. Most faculty would assume that an 
employer or police officer cannot enter an office, confiscate, and then photocopy, the notes an 
employee wrote on her work-provided paper, but many defend the same action when the notes 
are intangible, electronic files. Most would regard the words on a page as different from the 
(employer-provided) ink used to write those words, but many still do not know whether having 
used a state-owned computer makes the words created one's own or someone else's. A pre-
computer-age employer who suspected that her employee was slacking off would have had to 
confront the employee. Should such employers today be allowed to wait until the employee has 
gone to lunch and start nosing through his e-mails to see what he's been doing? Would we 
accept that the employer could also install a small camera and watch what the employee does? 
Should the university be a different kind of employer? 
Although concerns about worker productivity are valid, it is plainly naïve to suggest that workers 
should not make any personal communications at work. We all inevitably play a social and a 
professional role at work: we celebrate employees' birthdays, we boost morale by throwing 
office parties, we announce the births of children and grandchildren, we collectively grieve the 
death of co-workers, and we even arrange lunch and social outings with people--precisely 
because establishing personal connections in addition to professional ties is good business for 
the university. In short, we treat people like human beings. At least I hope we do. 
Beyond issues of snooping, we must consider whether the electronic files a person generates 
count as her property or as the property of the university administration. You may have written 
something in your spare time and stored it, along with other work-related items, on the computer 
provided at work--as innocently as you'd stick a bottle of aspirin in one of your employer-
provided desk drawers or display a family photo on an employer-provided bookshelf. What 
makes a family photo on your computer, as a screen saver for example, any different? Does 
putting that family photo on the computer suddenly make it state property if the photo on the 
bookshelf does not become state property? 
More significant, some professors work as private consultants using their university-provided 
computing equipment. Some departments endorse such private consultancies precisely 
because doing so enables them to retain the most talented and well-funded faculty members. 
The employer provides the electronic equipment on which we work, but does that mean the 
employer owns the electronic files we created, including files associated with a private 
consultancy? 
Intellectual property policies parcel out ownership in specific ways to specific university actors. 
But even if they did not, I suggest that computer searches must be limited as a matter of policy--
regardless of which files the state thinks it owns. Justifying computer searches or seizures on 
ownership grounds has severe moral limitations. It diminishes worker trust in employers, 
productivity on the job, and the climate of academic freedom. Saying that the state has a right to 
seize and search an employee's computer files simply because it owns the computer is like 
saying a man gets to rape his wife simply because he's her husband. 
Regardless of where you come down on the issue of who owns which electronic files, the issue 
of access to those files must therefore be settled. The human resources department of the state 
in which I worked created a policy saying that employees at state agencies cannot expect 
privacy in their electronic files. Although many of my colleagues reacted to this policy with a 
sense of chilled helplessness, the policy hardly gives law enforcement gratuitous access to 
employees' computer files. Indeed, individual state agencies can still decide the who, what, 
where, when, why, and how of computer privacy and access. 
We can also apply the Fourth Amendment to the electronic environment, bearing in mind its 
intent to protect us from unreasonable search and seizure. In many cases, the courts have told 
us that in order to make a Fourth Amendment claim that one was subject to an unreasonable 
search and seizure, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. How should the 
Fourth Amendment apply to professors? Should it apply to cases involving computer files in our 
locked offices or to documents transmitted electronically across university networks? Indeed, it 
is as yet unclear how such questions will be answered for the electronic files of professors (or 
other state employees). But let me use myself as an example. I'd say I had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in my computer files, given that they were stored on a computer in my 
office, which was assigned only to me and to which I had a key. Sometimes I stayed at my office 
all night working and fell asleep, face huddled into a pillow I kept there for just such occasions. I 
had a reasonable expectation that, unless it was 5 A.M. when the building janitor made his 
rounds to empty the garbage from each office, nobody would wake me up. The solitude I 
enjoyed in my individually assigned, locked office was so great that even the police officers had 
no way to enter it aside from urging the department secretary to use his master key to let them 
in. 
In addition to the solitary physical space enjoyed by the machine and me, I used a personal 
identification and password to get into my e-mail. It's true that technology is such that the 
privacy of electronic communications cannot be guaranteed, but the personal access and 
password gave me a sense that the messages and files sent to me were intended to be 
receivable only by me. Further, when I logged onto my computer, created a new document, or 
sent an e-mail message, no banner appeared on my computer screen telling me that what I was 
about to create, send, or receive was state-owned or state-searchable information. Finally, my 
Word files are not up for public view in any shared folder or otherwise attached to a computer 
network, on campus or elsewhere. Hence I had no reason to assume that anyone else could or 
should view my files, particularly those that never traverse the Net. 
What reasonable professor in this position would not have experienced the police confiscation 
and search of computer files as surprising and intrusive? It's not that professors expect to work 
in secret; indeed, we routinely publish our work and account for our activities. But while we do 
this work, increasingly on a computer, we do expect to be left alone. Consider the regulations 
and the freedoms in the predigital workplace. Why should we expect that our department chair 
will read a letter we send by e-mail if we don't expect her to read a letter we send out through 
the office mailroom? We must not let the PC kill our expectations of privacy. 
In "Academic Freedom and Electronic Communications," a report published in the July--August 
1997 issue of Academe, the AAUP suggests that e-mail messages to and from university 
professors be treated like regular mail, which is considered private even when we send it out 
through the campus mailroom. The report offers helpful guidelines for those creating computer 
privacy policies. The AAUP was, however, perhaps overly optimistic about academic 
environments in not foreseeing the possibility of law-enforcement agents doing computer 
seizures and searches without warrants. It is already difficult for a department head, dean, or 
provost to justify suddenly taking a professor's computer or files. Campus police officers' doing 
so poses particularly grave concerns. 
Allowing the police unfettered access to files stored on university-provided computers at state 
schools compromises free speech and academic freedom more generally. It threatens our 
international colleagues, both professors and students, even more than it threatens me, a U.S. 
citizen of European descent. What if several professors of Iraqi descent received an anonymous 
e-mail message containing political arguments critical of U.S. foreign policy or claiming 
responsibility for anti-U.S, graffiti? If receiving a spam message about antirape graffiti generated 
the intrusion that it did, what level of intrusion will be considered justifiable in this arguably more 
extreme hypothetical circumstance? 
Computergate was a chilling welcome to a new McCarthyism, a McCarthyism not run by a 
centralized political authority, but enabled by a specific way of understanding and treating 
computer technology. This "McCarthyism 2.0" serves as a wake-up call. I've spoken to many 
professors who mistakenly think that having an acceptable-use policy for comnmnications 
systems is the same as having a privacy or access policy. Some assume that capricious 
computer searches, whether by police, a department head, or other employee, wouldn't happen 
on their campuses. I like to imagine that my now ex-university regards what happened to me as 
a technological regret. I do not regret working on a state-provided computer any more than I 
regret teaching in a state-provided classroom building. 
The answer is not to advocate faculty members' bringing their own private computers into work, 
leaving their campus offices to work in their own homes, or using encryption software. Such 
strategies sidestep the real problem. An expectation of privacy does not require scholars to sit in 
offices with the curtains drawn across their windows; drawing curtains on their computer 
Windows should not be required either. Storing data on one's own privately purchased external 
hard drive could erode workplace privacy rights by indicating one does not have a subjective 
expectation of privacy unless one works on a privately purchased computer. Nor is the solution 
to keep your PC clean of any personal or non-work-related information (another strategy that 
concedes access to or ownership of electronic files to the state). Some of us simply cannot PC 
our PC because our work is that which might appear inappropriate (as in my case), or that 
which is personal (a professor writing an autobiographical poem, for example, or responding by 
e-mail to a student in crisis), or that which arouses political suspicion (a professor researching 
Islamic cultures, for example). 
Do we really want to--and can we--write, teach, conduct research, and serve the public and our 
profession with a constant consciousness of an administrative or state presence? We must 
create or revise our universities' policies to ensure that the electronic environment enhances, 
rather than erodes, academic freedom and civil liberties, lest the P in PC change from Personal 
to Police. 
 
